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Executive Directors

Service contracts

Executive directors are employed under service contracts that provide for a maximum of one year’s notice. The contracts neither specify a predetermined level of severance payment nor contain specific provisions in respect of change in control. The Committee believes that, as a general rule, notice periods should be 12 months and that the directors should, subject to practice within their base country, be required to mitigate their damages in the event of termination. The Committee will, however, note local market conditions so as to ensure that the terms offered are appropriate to attract and retain top executives operating in global businesses.

The service contracts for executive directors (and for approximately 100 other senior executives) contain the following three provisions:

  • non-compete provisions which prevent them from working with specified competitors, from recruiting Reed Elsevier employees and from soliciting Reed Elsevier customers for a period of 12 months after leaving employment;
  • in the event of their resigning, they will immediately lose all rights to any outstanding awards under the LTIP, ESOS and BIP granted from 2004 onwards including any vested but unexercised options; and
  • in the event that they were to join a specified competitor within 12 months of termination, any gains made in the six months prior to termination on the vesting or exercise of an LTIP, ESOS and BIP award made from 2004 onwards shall be repayable.

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Each of the executive directors has a service contract, as summarised in the table below.

  Contract Date Expiry date
(subject to notice period)
Notice period Subject to:
Gerard van de Aast(i) 15 November 2000 Ended
31 December 2008
English law
Mark Armour(i) 7 October 1996 29 July 2014 12 months English law
Sir Crispin Davis(i) 19 July 1999 19 March 2009 12 months English law
Erik Engstrom(i) 25 June 2004 14 June 2025 12 months English law
Andrew Prozes(ii) 5 July 2000 Indefinite 12 months’ salary
payable for termination
without cause
New York law
Ian Smith(i) 3 November 2008 22 January 2019 12 months English law
Patrick Tierney(ii) 19 November 2002 Retired 30 January 2008 New York law

(i) Employed by Reed Elsevier Group plc    (ii) Employed by Reed Elsevier Inc.

Gerard van de Aast’s severance arrangements

Gerard van de Aast’s position as CEO of Reed Business ceased to exist with effect from 15 December 2008 and his employment ended on 31 December 2008. He received the following compensation on termination:

  • a gross cash sum of £391,000, equal to eight months’ annual base salary, representing a mitigated payment in respect of his notice period (this payment was made in January 2009 and will be reported in the audited section of the 2009 remuneration report); and
  • an augmentation of his accrued benefit under the UK defined benefit pension arrangement by an amount that reflects the crediting of his pensionable service by eight months (also reflecting mitigation).

His share-based awards were treated in accordance with the rules of the respective plans and his LTIP shareholding requirement ceased on termination.

Sir Crispin Davis’ retirement arrangements

The Committee determined that the following terms shall apply in respect of Sir Crispin Davis’ retirement in March 2009:

  • he will continue to be eligible for a pro rata 2009 annual bonus under the AIP. Any bonus due will be paid in the first quarter of 2010 and will be subject to performance in the same way as the bonuses payable to the other executive directors;
  • as is standard practice for retirements early in the year, he will not receive 2009 grants under ESOS and LTIP and will not participate in the 2009 BIP;
  • no termination payments are due since he will be retiring;
  • all unvested share-based awards will be treated in accordance with the rules of the plans, and outstanding options will be exercisable for three-and-a-half years from retirement; and
  • his LTIP shareholding requirement will cease on retirement.

Ian Smith’s remuneration arrangements

Ian Smith’s base salary on his recruitment on 1 January 2009 was £900,000. He has an on target annual bonus opportunity under AIP of 100% of base salary for 2009 and will be eligible to participate in BIP in 2010 up to a maximum of 50% of his earned annual bonus for 2009.

Ian Smith will be eligible to participate in ESOS and will receive a grant of an option over shares with a market value on the date of grant of 100% of his base salary in February 2009. In addition, he is eligible for a target grant under the 2009-11 cycle of the LTIP with a market value on the date of grant of 135% of base salary. Ian Smith is subject to a shareholding requirement of three times salary to be built up over five years.

The Company will pay a cash allowance in lieu of pension equal to 30% of his base salary. His other benefits are a company car, private medical insurance, disability and life assurance.

Under the terms of his contract, Ian Smith is eligible for an award of performance shares with a market value equal to 90% of his base salary. The grant will be made on 19 February 2009, on terms equivalent to the 2008 LTIP awards made to other executive directors (described here), including the same vesting date, vesting schedule, performance conditions (subject to such adjustments as the Committee considers appropriate) and entitlement to notional dividends.

Any shares to which Ian Smith becomes entitled when the award vests, subject to performance, in 2011 will be satisfied out of existing ordinary shares only. The award will not be pensionable.

The Committee considered the grant of this performance share award to have been essential to secure Ian Smith’s services, and was satisfied that the award was appropriate and would align his interests with those of shareholders. As this was a special arrangement to facilitate, in unusual circumstances, Ian Smith’s recruitment, shareholder approval was not required by virtue of 9.4.2(2)R of the UK Listing Rules.